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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

This is an appeal from the Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw, and Order,
entered by the District Court for the First Judicial District, the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick
presiding, on June 1, 2012.

11.

That district court case was actually consolidated appeals from the Board of Tax Appeals
decision regarding the 2010 valuation, and the Kootenai County Board of Equalization decision
regarding 2011 valuation of an unbuildable waterfront lot on Spirit Lake. The 2010 assessor's
valuation was appealed to the Kootenai County Board of equalization, which upheld the
Assessor's valuation. That decision was appealed to the Board of Tax appeals which also
affirmed the valuation.
While the Board of Tax Appeals action was pending, 2011 valuations were issued.
Taxpayers again appealed to the Board ofEqualization, which upheld the 2011 valuation without
hearing the oral presentation by the Assessor, taking the suggestion of the Assessor's office that
there was no reason to act since the Board of Tax Appeals had the issue under consideration.
Both the 2010 and 2011 valuations were appealed to the District Court. The matter was
heard on the agency record and on additional testimony and exhibits at a half day trial on
February 12, 2012. The amended findings, conclusions and order which are being appealed here
were entered on June 1, 2012.
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111.

The Petitioners (hereafter "taxpayers) are the owners of lot 7, block 4 of Carroll's
homesites in Kootenai County.(Parcel # 012200040070) That lot is a 78 foot waterfront site on
Spirit Lake in Kootenai County. Both sides agree that the lot is not a buildable site because there
is no sewer available and no on site drainfield is possible because of proximity to Spirit Lake.
There are two pump houses on the site, providing water to the residents of the subdivision. The
valuation of the pump houses is not at issue.
At all times relevant here, the Kootenai County Assessor has calculated the value of
unbuildable waterfront by applying a percentage reduction to the value that the waterfront would
have if it were buildable. Taxpayers have not challenged the value their property would have if
buildable. They do not challenge the use of a percentage reduction from buildable values as an
appropriate method for determining market value. They do, however, contest the percentage
reduction which should be applied to determine market value. What the appropriate percentage
reduction should be is the ultimate issue in this matter.
Taxpayers believe that a two thirds (66.66%) reduction is supported by the evidence
while the Assessor contends that a reduction of one half (50%) is the correct calculation.
Taxpayers have consistently asked that market value appraisal standards be applied and
believe the boards and court below failed to recognize that the ad valorem trained assessors
presented no valuation evidence which complies with generally accepted market value appraisal
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standards. The assessor presented an entire case using techniques and analysis designed to
measure overall compliance with ad valorem mass appraisal assessment, but having no validity
or acceptance as a measure of fair market value in an individual case.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.
The trial court erred in determining the burden of proof applicable in this matter, by
applying the rule from Kimbrough v. Idaho Board ofTax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417, 247 P.3d 644
(2011), and presuming the assessor's valuation was correct and could be overcome only by
showing it was "manifestly excessive, fraudulent or oppressive, or arbitrary, capricious, and
resulting in discrimination against the taxpayer." Taxpayers contend that the proper burden of
proof is the preponderance of evidence test. Because the trial court used the wrong burden of
proof standard, taxpayers challenge all findings of fact and conclusions of law.

II.
The court erred in its order fixing values for 2010 and 2011. It transposed the values for
the two years and failed to include the value of improvements in the 2011 valuation.
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III.
The court erred in its order freezing the value for the subsequent year. I.C. §63-3813, the
statute the trial court cited as authority for freezing the value, does not apply to this case.
IV.
The court erred in finding of fact 3 and in its conclusions of law. It correctly stated the
2010 valuation, but omitted the 2011 valuation which is necessary to determine the ultimate
valuation for 2011.

v.
The trial court erred in finding of fact 7 concerning the matched pair analysis ..
The first matched pair analysis supported an 86% valuation rate, not 50% as the court found.
VI.
The trial court erred in finding "there is no evidence in the record which establishes that
the assessors determination was 'manifestly fraudulent or oppressive, or arbitrary, capricious and
resulting in discrimination against the taxpayer." There is substantial evidence in the record that
market value for the subject property is one third of the value it would have if buildable. Merris
v. Ada County,100 Idaho 59, 593 P.2d 394 (1979) establishes that valuation is arbitrary if it does

not reflect fair market value.
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VII.
The court erred in finding that nothing in the record indicates the assessor is limited in
applying sales from other lakes to establish values on Spirit Lake. The evidence established that
going out to other geographic markets is an acceptable technique in some cases, but also shows
that the technique was not appropriate in this case because there were two reliable Spirit Lake
sales and because mandatory location adjustments were not applied.

VIII.
The court erred in concluding that taxpayers have not established the appraisal fails to
reflect full market value of the property and in affirming the assessor's valuation even though
the assessor presented only evidence of compliance with mass appraisal standards and tax
commission guidelines and neither presented any evidence nor rebutted any of petitioners
evidence relating to compliance with generally accepted market value appraisal standards.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Kimbrough v. Idaho Board ofTax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417 (419-420) 247 P.3d 644 (2011) states:
"The district court held a trial de novo pursuant to LC. 63-3812(c ).'Where the
district
court conducts a trial de novo in an appeal of a BTA decision, this Court defers to the district
court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence, but exercises free review
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over the district court's conclusions of law.' The interpretation of a statute is a question of law
subject to free review."
(citations omitted)

ARGUMENT
A. The Supreme Court should decide this case

The Idaho Supreme Court should hear and decide this appeal in order to clarifY for lower
courts, agencies, boards and litigants what the existing law in this area is. Taxpayers are not
seeking to change any law. They are simply asking that existing law be applied. The trial court
didn't understand the difference between the standard for appellate review and the burden of
proof at trial. The Kootenai County Board of Equalization, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the
trial court didn't address the distinction between "market value" and "market value for
assessment purposes."
In all the hearings below in this case and in prior property tax appeals Sid Wurzburg has
been involved in, the assessor presented substantial evidence that their assessments complied
with the Idaho State Commission's rules for ad valorem mass appraisal. The boards and lower
court here and in those other cases found this was sufficient to sustain the assessor's valuation.
That is not the law. The issue is whether the assessment represents market value as established
by generally accepted appraisal standards. Once the taxpayer meets the burden of going forward,
the assessor must use market value techniques, not the looser ad valorem mass appraisal
techniques to rebut taxpayer's evidence. Taxpayers believe this misunderstanding of the law
probably exists in other cases throughout the state. Clarification is needed to promote judicial
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efficiency by eliminating appeals and to guarantee that the individual taxpayer receives a fair
hearing at the county and Board of Tax Appeals levels.
This case presents a unique opportunity for clarification. Small value residential issues
rarely get to the appellate court level because the costs of attorneys and appraisal experts far
exceed any monetary return on tax savings. This case is here because an experienced appraiser
and an experienced Washington state attorney are among the owners of the subject property and
have chosen to pursue this as a matter of principle, hoping to create a precedent guiding future
appeals by residential property owners.
B. Summary and Outline
There are really two parts to this argument. Assignments of error I. through IV. involve
clear errors of law which require reversal of the district court. Major errors are: ( 1) The trial
court's using the wrong burden of proof, an error affecting all factual determinations; (2)
Freezing the 2012 valuation without any legal authority. Simple but significant errors are:
omitting needed finings of fact: transposing valuations for the two tax years involved; and failing
to include the value of improvements when calculating property values.
Assignments of error V. through VII. address taxpayers' argument that because the
assessor presented only evidence of compliance with ad valorem mass appraisal standards and
no evidence complying with accepted market value appraisal standards, reversal and entry of
judgment for taxpayers is the proper remedy.
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ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I.
The district court detem1ined that the taxpayers were required to prove that the assessor's
determination was "manifestly excessive, fraudulent, or oppressive; or arbitrary, capricious , and
resulting in discrimination against the taxpayer." (R., p.358-359, f.n.6.) That was the standard
for both burden of proof and appellate review before Legislative action in 2003, and is still the
standard for appellate review applied by the Idaho Supreme Court in reviewing District court
decisions. It is not the burden of proof standard applicable to this trial in district court.
I.C. §63-511(4) governs appeals from the board of equalization and I.C. §63-3812(c)
appeals from the board of tax appeals. Both state: "A preponderance of the evidence shall suffice
to sustain the burden of proof."
In spite of that clear statutory language, the trial court accepted the Respondent's view
that the Kimbrough case controlled the standard for burden of proof, rejecting taxpayers' rebuttal
argument that Kimbrough applied only to appellate review of District Court decisions. In
footnote 6 (R., p 358-359) it did express concern about the apparent discrepancy between
Kimbrough and LC. §63-511(4) and I.C. §63-3812. There is no discrepancy. A close reading of
Kimbrough, the statutes and the legislative history clearly shows that this District Court
proceeding is a de novo trial with a preponderance of the evidence standard. 1be Kimbrough
language relied upon by the district court judge in this case applies only to appellate review of
the District Court decision.
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Until 2003 taxpayers appealing a county board of equalization determination were
required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the assessment was manifestly
excessive, arbitrary and capricious, or fraudulent and oppressive. The Legislature changed that
when House Bill 302 was signed by the Governor on April 8, 2003. It became Chapter 266 of the
2003 session laws and changed the burden of proof in appeals of assessor's valuation
determinations.
Section 3 of House Bill302 applied the changes to appeals form the Board of
Equalization. It amended IC §63-511 "in any appeal taken to the board of tax appeals or the
district court" Section 4 amended I.C. §63-3812 concerning appeals from the Board of Tax
Appeals to the District Court. Both added "A preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to
sustain the burden of proof."
The complete 5 page legislative history is attached as appendix 1. The legislative
statement of purpose at page 5 of that appendix explicitly states that the new law applies "to
appeals of property tax assessments to the County Board ofEqualization, the Board of Tax
Appeals or the District Court" and that the clear and convincing and manifestly excessive,
arbitrary and capricious, or fraudulent and oppressive standards no longer apply. (see highlighted
language at page 5 of appendix 1) The legislative action changed the burden of proof rules for
the board of tax appeals and district court appeals from the board of equalization. It did not
mention supreme court review of district court determinations, so that review of District Court
decisions continues under the old rules.
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This analysis of statutory language and legislative history clearly shows that the apparent
discrepancy between Kimbrough and I. C. §63(511 )(4) mentioned by the trial court in footnote 6
of the opinion does not actually exist. The Assessor's value is not presumed to be correct. The
district Court hearing is a simple de novo trial like any other civil action. The Petitioner has the
burden of producing some credible evidence. Once that burden of going forward is met, a simple
preponderance of evidence decides the case.

The Court and Respondent failed to recognize the distinction between the burden of proof
at trial and the standard for appellate review of district court decisions. As a result, the Court
applied the wrong standard for burden of proof and so the decision below and all factual and
legal fmdings based on weighing of evidence under the improper burden of proof standard must
be reversed.
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II.
The trial court order affirmed the assessor's valuation and set values at $95,472.00 for
2010 and $113,790 for 2010. (R., p.360) Both numbers are wrong because they are not the
assessor's valuations. The assessor's notices establish the valuation tor 2010 at $113,790 (R., p
25), and for 2011 at $96,912.00 (R., p.16) The trial court apparently switched the two years
valuations and failed to include the improvement value in the 2011 number. Taxpayers contend
the values should be substantially lower, but if the assessor's valuation were to be affirmed, the
order must accurately state the values set by the assessor.
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ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III.
The trial court ordered "that the value will remain at $113,790 for the subsequent year in
accordance with I.C. §63-3813." (R., p.360) That number is wrong because the actual2011
assessors valuation was $96,912 as explained in the above discussion of assignment of error II.
Even more important is the fact that district court has no legal authority to freeze the
value for the subsequent year. I.C. §63-3813 (appendix 2) applies only to Board of Tax Appeals
decisions "which are not appealed to the district court within the prescribed time .... ". The 2011
valuation was appealed directly to the district court from the county board of equalization. There
was no board of tax appeals detennination so the statute doesn't apply. The 2010 valuation was
appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals, but a timely appeal to the district court means that, again,
the statute does not apply.
Even if I.C. §63-3813 applied, its proviso: ''that annual trending or equalization applied
to all properties of a property class or category within the county or a clearly defined area shall
still apply" requires that the percentage reduction for waterfront properties in this area of Spirit
Lake for 2012 be applied to the subject property. The district court clearly exceeded its authority
in ordering the value remain unchanged for the subsequent year, and its order must be reversed.

An interesting point not in the record is that in fact the assessor set the 20 12 value at
$82,571, applying the 2012 annual trending adjustment to the 2011 valuation. That 2012
valuation is dated May 31, 2012, over a month after the district court's initial order of April 26,
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2012 (R., p. 334) but one day before the amended order (R., p.348) The assessor's 2012
valuation would be correct if the 50% discount was proper, but is in violation of the district
court's order. Reversal will establish that the assessor is not in contempt for violating the court
order.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
In its :fmding of fact 3, the court properly recited the assessor's 2010 valuation but made no
mention of 2011. Since this appeal involves both the 201 0 and 2011 tax years, a finding of fact
on the 2011 valuation is required.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
Finding of fact 7 discusses the assessor's matched pair analysis. The last sentence of the
finding reads: "The analysis supported the assessor's determination that non-buildable lake front
lots are fifty percent of the value ofbuildable lots." (R., p.351) The two matched pair sales were
explained at pages 230 and 231 of the clerks records. Highlighted copies of those pages are
attached as appendices 4 and 5. Appendix 4 deals with the August and September 2007 sales of
properties on Coeur d'Alene lake. The assessor's own highlighted data shows the unbuildable
property (sale 7) sold for $2,550 per front foot, and the buildable property (sale 11) for $2,971

12

per front foot. 2550 divided by 2971 yields a non buildable to buildable rate of 86 percent, not
even close to 50%.
Appendix 5 concerns the March and September 2008 sales on Hayden Lake. Again the
assessor's data has been highlighted. This time the situation is more complicated. Sale 9, the
unbuildable lot sold for $2,637 per front foot. Sale 12 was assumed buildable because of
information received from Multiple Listing Service. The sale price according to the exhibit was
$4,948 per front foot, resulting in a ratio of 53%. This entire calculation is questionable however,
because further investigation revealed that the property was actually unbuildable. Taxpayers'
BTA exhibit 16 (R., p.201) is a pro val form from the assessor's office printed on Dec 12,2010
and showing that this 44.9 foot lot is unbuildable. This transformation from buildable to
unbuildable shows there are some unknown factors affecting this property and sale. It is of
questionable value in any matched pair analysis until those unknowns are investigated. A market
value appraiser would do that investigation, but it might be beyond the scope of an ad valorem
mass assessment.
The ratios which conclude each of the individual sale sections are assessed value to sale
price. These may be important to the tax commission mandated ratio studies, but prove nothing
about market value in each individual case. This is just another case of the assessor using mass
appraisal techniques and tools inappropriately and of the trial court accepting the evidence
without properly evaluating it.
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The assessor's matched pair analysis did not support the 50% ratio so the finding is not
supported by the evidence. If any matched pair is used, it should be the two 1998 Peterson
transactions which Erin Sacksteder conceded were a "classic perfect paired sale". (Tr. P.56, L.
21 -P.57, L.5)
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OFASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI.
The trial court found "there is no evidence in the record which establishes that the
assessor's determination was 'manifestly fraudulent or oppressive, or arbitrary, capricious and
resulting in discrimination against the taxpayer'." (R., p. 358) As discussed above, this is not the
applicable burden of proof standard, but even if it were, the trial court erred because there is
substantial unchallenged evidence that the assessor's determination does not reflect market
value.
In Merris v. Ada County 100 Idaho 59 (63),593 P.2d 394 (398) this court declared: "An
arbitrary valuation is one that does not reflect the fair market value or full cash value of the
property and crumot stand, notwithstanding the fact that it may be the result of application of one
of the approved methods of appraisal set out in State Tax Commission regulations."
At first reading it may seem strange that an assessor's determination which complies with
State Tax Commission regulations would be set aside. It is important to understand that the "fair
market value or full cash value" the Merris court refers to is different than the "market value for
assessment purposes" which is the valuation the assessor is required to make.
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Market value is defined in I.C. 63-201(15)
"(15) 'Market value' means the amount of United States dollars or equivalent for
which, in all probability, a property would exchange hands between a willing seller,
under no compulsion to sell, and an informed, capable buyer, with a reasonable time
allowed to consummate the sale, substantiated by a reasonable down or full cash
payment."
"Market value for assessment purposes" is the determination of value the assessor makes
for the purpose of taxation in accordance with rules established by the tax commission. (I.C. 63205, I.C. 63-208) The Appraisal Institute cautions:
"Assessment data should generally not be used to develop an opinion of market value.
Budgetary and time constraints on the public agencies responsible for collecting and maintaining
ofReal Estate,
assessment data can cast doubt on the accuracy of that data." (The Appraisal
Pet. Ex. 4-2, first full paragraph)

Darin Krier, a deputy assessor in Kootenai County, confirmed this lack of precision in a 2005
board of equalization hearing when he testified"
"And here's the issue. They're asking us to be more finite in our adjustment process than mass
appraisal really allows for. Yes if we had every sale and has all the time to say you know what,
there's a list of plus and minus and I'm going to go up there and Sid's might be 2500, this one's
24, this one's 26 and as soon as you do that then they're coming in and saying you can do that.
How can you do that to me? That's the issue. We're trying to approximate market value. If you
guys feel that there is some issues that Sid has valid points on, then make the adjustment. We
don't feel we can do that with the process that we're using." (Pet. Ex. 2)
The assessor makes an estimate of market value according to tax commission rules.
Usually those estimates are accurate, but 1.\feris makes it clear that when a taxpayer produces
credible evidence of market value, the issue becomes market value, not value for assessment

15

purposes. The assessor apparently doesn't understand this principle. They presented no standard
market value in this case. In the earlier 2005 Bronze Bay Board of Equalization hearing deputy
assessor Sacksteder was discussing the taxpayer's comparable sale evidence. He admitted that
the market was changing and said that the assessor's office would look at that issue when the
next revaluation came up in 2008.(R., p. 135, L. 7-11) That periodic revaluation is what
assessors following mass appraisal rules do, but markets can and do change between
revaluations. That is why the Appraisal Institute warns that interim market changes may not be
reflected in assessed value. (The Appraisal of Real Estate, Pet. Ex. 4-1, last two paragraphs) The
assessor has in the past presented, and still today presents mass appraisal evidence , apparently
believing that is sufficient, but market value evidence is required once the taxpayer meets the
initial burden of presenting some credible evidence.
Taxpayers' entire case below consisted of testimony relating to market value and the
distinction between market value and value for assessment. Taxpayers proved that the assessor's
valuation did not accurately reflect fair market value and thus established the arbitrary nature of
the valuation under the Merris standard. There was no issue about the market value for buildable
property. The only issue was the appropriate discount to be applied to that buildable value to
determine fair market value for the unbuildable subject property. All the evidence relating to that
ratio is testimony about fair market value.
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Sid Wurzburg testified that it was not necessary to go out to other lakes when there were
two valid Spirit Lake sales which establish the one third valuation ratio was appropriate. (Tr.,
p.70 L. 23; p.71, L. 6)
Tony Higley, an appraiser with many years experience (Pet EX 13) testified both by
affidavit (R., p.133) and at trial (Tr., p.84,L.1-12) that the value was one third of the buildable
value.
Gerald Peterson, who bought and sold a Spirit Lake waterfront lot in 1998 explained in
an affidavit the details of that sale and opined that the one third ratio was appropriate. (R., p.3132)
Rick Witter's affidavit (R., p.124-125) states he believes the ratio is one third to one half
and explains why he was a specially motivated buyer of the lot next door to his summer cabin
and why the price he paid for the lot he bought in 2004 is not a fair representation of market
value.
Taxpayers presented numerous exhibits, at trial and in the record from board of tax
appeals and board of equalization hearings citing Appraisal Institute publications relating to fair
market value definitions and appraisal techniques. These are discussed in detail below.
All tllis evidence was presented to establish the fair market value of the property and thus
the arbitrary nature of the assessor's valuation. There was substantial evidence that the fair
market value was one third and not one half of the buildable value. The trial court improperly
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applied a presumption that the assessor's valuation is correct and failed to understand that a
valuation which does not reflect fair market value is, by definition, arbitrary. The trial court's
findings and conclusions that "the Petitioner failed to show that the assessor's application of the
reduction in value is 'manifestly excessive, fraudulent or oppressive; or arbitrary, capricious and
resulting in discrimination against the taxpayer.'" must be reversed because they were based on
the trial court's application of an improper presumption and an improper burden of proof, and
because the assessor presented no credible evidence rebutting taxpayers' case.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VII.
The trial court, in the first two paragraphs at page 12 of the amended findings and order, (R.,
p.359) rejected taxpayers' position that only Spirit Lake comparables were appropriate. It found
" nothing in the record indicates that the assessor is limited in such a fashion for purposes of
applying the sales- comparison method." It then went on to discuss the characteristics of the
properties compared and concluded that "the fifty percent reduction was appropriate for the
properties that were used as comparables to the subject property" and that the petitioner had not
established that the assessor's method was incorrect.
The first problem with this fmding has already been discussed. It is based on the trial
court's misapplication of the rules regarding burden of proof.
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The next problem is that the court is plainly wrong. The fifty percent reduction was not
even used by the assessor for many of those so called comparables. Petitioners' exhibit 10
presents non buildable to buildable ratios used by the assessor in the 2003 and 2008 revaluation
cycles for comparable sales number 1 through 10 used by the assessor in its spreadsheet exhibit
(R., p. 220) These ratios were furnished by the assessor in discovery. Its accuracy was
unchallenged at trial.(Tr. 43, L.8) . There were eight non buildable comparables from other lakes
used by the assessor. Four of those did use the fifty percent reduction. The other four used
reductions of 60%,29%, 45% and 56% in 2003 and 56% , 25%, 43%, and 40% in 2008. (The
Exhibit 10 sales ratios have been converted here to percentage ofbuildable value to be consistent
with the trial court's language.) Because one half of the properties did not use the 50% reduction,
the court erred in the finding. It is clear that the trial court did not understand the evidence and
that court's finding is not supported by the facts and evidence.
The record is clear that going out geographically and going back in time are appropriate
methods in some cases. The Appraising The Tough Ones text, cited by both petitioners and the
Board of Tax Appeals states:
"When the appraiser goes back in time to find comparable sale data, a market
condition (time) adjustment is considered. When the appraiser goes out geographically to
find comparable sales in an alternative market, a location adjustment is
required."(emphasis added) (Pet. Ex 7-6 first two sentences)
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Notice the differences between the two methods. The adjustment is "considered" when
going back in time, but "required" when going out geographically. No time adjustment is needed
for the Peterson sales because the property was resold within months in a stable market. The time
adjustment for the Ringling sale is automatic because the buildable sale price to which the
unbuildable reduction is applied has been time adjusted by the assessor. (See "time adj sale
price", column 6, row 2, of assessor's spreadsheet, Attachment 3)
No location adjustment was applied by the assessor, even though the assessor's office has
conceded that the lakes are different and they try not to compare them. (R.. p.l35, L. 12-14)
Petitioners trial exhibits 9,10,and 11 and the Sales Data Summary exhibit from the Board of
Tax Appeals hearing (R.P. 120-121) clearly show the various markets are different and thus
location adjustments are required. None were applied in the assessor's analysis.
Petitioners' trial exhibit. #9 shows the annual trending adjustments made to waterfront
properties in various markets between 2003 and 2011. An entry of 1.0 means either no change
from the previous year or in years 2003 and 2008 that the land had a new value set in a
reevaluation year. Any number means the prior years value was multiplied by than number to get
the current year's value. Thus an entry of"1.5" means the previous years value was multiplied
by 1.5 to get the new value-thus a 50% increase from one year to the next. An entry "85" means
there was a 15% decrease for the year. The exhibit clearly shows the markets all behave
differently. For example, in 2006, depending where your waterfront was, the land value may
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have held constant or increased 300%. In 2007 the range was from a 5% loss to a 40% gain. In
2011 he range varied from a 30% loss to no change
Petitioners' trial exhibit #10 compares the non-buildable to buildable ratios for the
supposed comparables used by the assessor and has been discussed above. In addition to the
2008 values which were used for the assessor's alleged comparables, it shows that in 2003 those
ratios were between 40% and 70%. This exhibit shows that both the historic record and the
current record prove that the markets are different.
Petitioners' trial exhibit # 11 shows the departure from base value (OCR 3) applied in the
2003 and 2008 valuation cycles for the same ten properties relied upon by the assessor.. The
differences are not as dramatic as those in exhibit # 10, but do show Coeur d'Alene lake
adjustments differ from the other lakes in both evaluation cycles.
The sales data summary (R.P.l20-121) shows the non-buildable to buildable ratios for the
properties furnished to taxpayers by the assessor which were claimed to support the 50% ratio.
The dates range from 1988 to 2008 and the ratios from 40% to 83.3%- clearly showing vast
differences in the discount ratios rather than supporting the 50%.
All four of these exhibits clearly show that the markets are very different, yet the assessor
did not apply any location adjustment as standard market value appraisal practices require. It is
submitted that no adjustment was applied because no rational basis for any adjustment exists.
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These are separate markets working independently of each other and thus cross-market
comparisons are inappropriate in this case.
The court gave some weight to the fact that the method was within the acceptable
methods adopted by the Tax Commission. The issue is not whether it complies with Tax
Commission rules, but whether it is appropriate under generally accepted appraisal standards
applicable to determining fair market value. This court made that clear in Merris v. Ada County
at p. 63 when it \\Tote:
"In our opinion the valuation of taxable property for assessment purposes must
reasonably approximate the fair market value of the property in order to effectuate
the policy embodied in Id. Const. Art. 7, § 5, i.e., that each taxpayer's property bear the
just proportion of the property tax burden."
The boards and court below were presented with several versions of a spreadsheet
purporting to show the 50% discount was appropriate. The most complete version of that spread
sheet is found at page 220 of the clerk's record and is attached as appendix 3. The "ratio"
column, highlighted in green by the assessor for the 2010 board of tax appeals hearing "should
appear to be assessed close to 100%" according to the text below the spreadsheet.
This spreadsheet is apparently a Tax Commission validation tool testing the overall
accuracy of a mass appraisal. At the board of tax appeals hearing Erin Sacksteder quoted from
the ratio study book to explain the 100% ratio they relied on in mass appraisal validation. He
said:
"In mass appraisal, we expect approximate equal numbers of properties to sell for
more than or less than their assessed value. Thus you can see it in the ratios. In other
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words, if the goal is market value 100%, individual properties randomly should be expected
to appear to be assessed too high or too low, but a category as a whole measured by a
significant number of representative sales should appear to be assessed close to 100%." (R.P.
p.67, L.8-13) Emphasis added.

It is not clear whether the words are Mr. Sacksteder's or a quote from the ratio study book, but
they clearly confirm taxpayers' position that proving compliance with tax commission ratio
studies proves nothing about market value in an individual case.
The assessor presented a spreadsheet with ratios which should be near 100% and
incorrectly claimed it supported the 50% discount ratio. The reason for this difference is that the
spreadsheet does not measure or prove anything about the issue in tllis case. It shows that the
assessor's mass appraisal overall meets tax commission guidelines. It does not show what the
discount for unbuildable property on any lake should be. The column titled "ratio" has nothing to
do with the ratio or discount rate which is at issue in thls case. It is a comparison of the assessed
price (the total land value on the spread sheet) with the sales price. (Tr., p.30, L.8-13) The
discount for unbuildable property doesn't appear anywhere in the spreadsheet. That discount has
already been applied to the number in the "total land value" column. Petitioners' exhibit 10 sets
out that discount. The only tlling the spreadsheet measures is the accuracy of the assessor's
determination of the individual discount rates . The two Spirit Lake sales are the farthest from
the desired 100% ratio on the entire spreadsheet (40% and 157%) The 40% sale is the Witter
purchase by a specially motivated buyer whlch simply can't be used. It doesn't meet the tests
required for use as a comparable. (Higley affidavit, R., p. 133 para. 5)

In addition, the special

interest was not disclosed by the assessor and no adjustment for the special interest was made, as
are required if the sale were to be used in any manner. (Appraisal of Real Estate, R., p.132,
second paragraph in "Conditions of Sale" section) The sale with the 157% spreadsheet ratio is
taxpayers' comp 1, the Ringling sale (R., p.29) which has a 71.7% discount, even greater than
the 66.66% ratio taxpayers contend should apply. The spreadsheet might be an appropriate
presentation for the tax commission to prove the individual discount rates are accurate, but has
zero probative value for a market value appraisal of any individual property, and clearly is
flawed with respect to Spirit Lake. It is exactly the "result which is mathematically precise, yet
meaningless or inappropriate for the particular appraisal" which the appraisal institute text warns
about. (Pet Ex. 8) The mean for the selected sales may be appropriate for showing compliance
with Tax Commission rules which limit going back in time, but does not comply with the cited
Appraisal Institute rules for market value appraisal. The trial court did not understand this
distinction.
In Appraising The Tough Ones, an Appraisal Institute text, cited as authoritative by the
Board of Tax Appeals (R., p.276) and conceded to be authoritative by deputy assessor Erin
Sacksteder, (Tr., p. 24, L6-11) is a discussion about the two options of going back in time and
going out geographically where the author states: "The first choice in these situations, of course,
is to find comparable data in the subject's market area because no location adjustment would be
necessary."(Pet. Ex. 7-4, 4th paragraph) (emphasis added) That is exactly what the taxpayers did
with the 2009 Ringling sale and the 1998 Peterson sale. Taxpayers' method is the preferred
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method according to appraisal authority, while the assessor's method is a fall back method and
has been improperly applied because no location adjustment was made.
It is improper first because location adjustments were required but never applied. It is

improper too because it is a total misuse of statistics and generally accepted appraisal standards.
In a market value appraisal the appraiser must research and understand each sale before reaching
a conclusion. (R., P .132) The Idaho Supreme Court recognized this in the Kimbrough case when
it stated:
"Regardless of which method is being used, the assessor may and should consider all
relevant factors to ensure that the taxpayer bears his or her share of the public tax burden,
including the actual cash-sale value in the property's locality." (150 Idaho at p. 421) Emphasis
added
In mass appraisals, budgetary and time restraints limit the data considered and thus cast
doubt on the accuracy of the data. (Appraisal Institute, Pet. Ex. 4-2) In a board of equalization
hearing on another property, Daren Krier, a deputy assessor conceded the limitations of mass
appraisals, stating that the taxpayers were asking them to be more finite than mass appraisal
allows and that mass appraisal results in an approximation of market value. (Pet. Ex 2)
The trial courts amended order placed some weight on the characteristics of the parcels
compared, citing topography, utility, beach type, view, road accessibility and site development.
(R., p. 359) These are the factors used in the Assessor's OCR tool for mass appraisal but do not
include all relevant factors necessary to a market value appraisal. One example is that the
appraisal institute standards require a consideration of all the services and utilities available to a
property; things such as water, sewer, phone, natural gas, and cable television. (Pet Ex. 6) The
assessor's mass appraisal tool does not consider any of these factors, (R., p.11 0)
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In response to a request by taxpayers, Rich Houser of the assessor's staff, furnished Mr.
Wurzburg data supporting the 50% adjustments throughout the county.(R, p. 65, L.6-12) The
data is found at pages 187 through 201 of the record. In addition there was information about the
1998 Peterson to McKinney sale. The data is summarized in the "Sales Data Summary" exhibit
(R., p.120,121) and shows that between 1989 and 2008 the ratios ranged from 40% to 83.3%
throughout the county. This is just the type of historical data that Tony Higley, the only licensed
market value appraiser to testify, said was so important to being able to validate data (Tr.,
p.85.,L. 2-15) and that the Appraisal Institute and this court in Kimbrough were referring to in
the language about researching and understanding all aspects of markets.
The assessor's office furnished the data in response to a request for data supporting the 50%
ratio, obviously thinking it was relevant to that issue. The assessor himselftestified that the ratio
issue has been around for several valuation cycles and a valuation cycle is five years.(Tr., p.98,
L.19-22) Erin Sacksteder, in redirect examination, testified that although the data from other
lakes showed a 40% reduction (meaning a 60% ratio )was appropriate, they used a 50% reduction
because "it's been a reduction that we've used and -in the past .... (Tr., p.50, L.6-7) The assessor
is guessing about the ratio for Spirit Lake in the assessment, not using the rigorous analysis
market value appraisal demands.
Tony Higley's affidavit explained that the assessor's method was not a meaningful use of
statistics because even in a large sample, the mean tells us nothing about the value or ratio in a
single selected case.(R., p.133,Para #6) The obvious truth and accuracy ofthat opinion is
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illustrated by the testimony of Erin Sacksteder. He was asked if he was going to lower the 71%
ratio on Coeur d'Alene property to the 50% mean. He responded "no." (Tr., p.54, L.-11) If the
mean were a valid indicator of an individual case, it would have to apply to all individual cases.
Clearly it does not and the assessor's methodology has no valid statistical basis.
Another common sense way to see the obvious flaws in the assessor's approach is to
assume that taxpayers are correct and that the proper discount is 66.6%. Market value appraisers
would look at the Ringling sale at 66%, then do a market analysis and history and find the
Peterson sale in 1998, also in the 66% range. Market value appraisal would get the numbers right
in this hypothetical. The assessor's mass appraisal approach ignores history and market value

appraisal standards, refuses to accept the one current sale as dispositive and perpetuates this error
forever unless two or more unbuildable properties sell on Spirit Lake in one three or four year
span.
ARGUNlENT IN SUPPORT OF ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VIII.
Throughout all stages of this property tax contest, taxpayers have urged the boards and
court to apply standard market value appraisal standards. The assessor has presented a case based
on its compliance with mass appraisal and tax commission rules. The analysis of the evidence
below will show that the assessor neither presented any evidence of fair market determined by
appropriate appraisal standards nor refuted any of taxpayers' evidence of what those standards
are or that they were properly applied by taxpayers' witnesses and exhibits. The assessor had full
opportunity to present such evidence, but did not. Thus the only evidence in the record supports
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the application of the 66.66 % discount rate and the trial courts decision should be reversed and
judgment entered for taxpayers applying the 66.66% discount rate.
Taxpayers' evidence has been discussed at length in this brief. It consisted of the
opinions of property owners Sid Wurzburg, Tony Higley, Gerald Peterson and Rick Witter, all
competent to give opinions on value as property owners. Courts allow property owners to
express opinions on value, (Empire Lumber v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, 132 Idaho295, 1998)
and nearby farmers to express opinions on the value of nearby farm land. (Ruud v. US. 256 F.2d
460, 461, 9th C. 1958, Montana Railway Co. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 354, 11 S.Ct.96, 34L.Ed2d
681 (1890) The local knowledge these non experts have is often not readily available to an
assessor, but may be essential to an accurate market value determination. Tony Higley is also an
experienced market value appraiser and qualified as an expert witness. Their opinions were
supported in the record by citations to authoritative standard appraisal institute texts, a source
also relied upon by the assessor and board of tax appeals, and testimony and exhibits showing
that values for unbuildable properties on other lakes were calculated by using discount rates
ranging from 56 % to 25% in the 2008 reevaluation cycle and that the supposedly similar
markets were in fact different in many respects.
The assessor's trial exhibits A through Hand M through 0 all related to the 1998
Peterson to Me Kinney transaction. They show the history from acquisition of secondary
property in 1978 by a deed of gift, and 1978 easements for road access and a septic easement
across 200 feet of the secondary property. In March of 1998 the waterfront property was
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purchased by the Petersons for $32,500,just $1,000 less than the assessor's $33,500 January
1,1998 assessment for unbuildable waterfront. (Pet.

12) The Petersons sold to the

McKi1meys on September 9, 1998 (Resp. Ex. F) for $95,550 (Resp. Ex. N) with the condition
that they provide a drain field easement on their adjacent land, if necessary. (Pet. Ex. 15) The
assessor argued in its trial brief that the recorded documentation did not support Mr. Peterson's
claim that the sale was the result of the addition of a septic easement because no easement was
recorded until 2000. The assessor was unaware that the 2000 easement was required by the 1998
sale agreement addendum. (Pet. Ex. 15) A competent market value appraiser would have
interviewed parties to determine the terms of sale. An assessor doing mass appraisal work cannot
be expected to do that kind of investigation. Local taxpayers familiar with their own and their
neighbors' properties, often have this knowledge that ad valorem assessors lack. Respondent's
trial exhibits A through I were submitted with that brief. After petitioners provided copies of the
sale agreement and addendum explaining the conditions of sale, petitioners offered no further
evidence on this issue, instead relying solely on the fact that it was old and thus shouldn't be
considered under the assessor's ad valorem mass appraisal technique. That may be the case if the
assessor were defending his performance at a tax commission compliance hearing, but the sale is
a valid comparable under standard market value appraisal standards.
The Peterson transactions are especially reliable because the same property sold in a short
time window in a stable market. Unlike all the other comparables cited by both parties, the
numbers here speak directly to value. In all other cases we are calculating the ratio by comparing
sales price to the assessor's estimate of value. No estimates are needed here. \Ve have a purchase
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at almost exactly the assessed unbuildable value; the conversion of the property to buildable by
creating the sewer easement; and the immediate sale at three times the purchase price.
The point of the above lengthy explanation is that an examination of respondent's trial
exhibits shows the assessor did not use accepted market value appraisal standards in the Peterson
to McKinney analysis. Respondents exhibits N, 0, and P which are duplicates of petitioners'
exhibits show this clearly: the value table and photographs are illustrative, not probative; the
board of tax appeals order is entitled to no weight in this de novo trial; and thus only respondents
exhibit J, the board of tax appeals agency record and Q, the respondents state board of tax
appeals documents have any possible probative value on the narrow issue before this court.
Respondent's exhibit Q placed in evidence the documentation offered before the board of
tax appeals. That exhibit is not included on the clerks exhibit disc furnished petitioner, but can be
found at pages 202-271 of the clerks record. A review of that exhibit shows that there is no
reference to market value appraisal standards, but the conclusion section (R., P. 214) relies on
compliance with state mass appraisal standards. The Peterson McKinney sale is rejected as
"outdated" with no further discussion. The Ringling purchase was minimized as a distress sale,
even though the owner/seller wouldn't tell the assessor why she sold. (Tr., p.39, L.1 - 3)
Commissioner Tondee said he didn't think it was a distress sale.( R., p.73, L. 1) Tony Higley, the
only licensed appraiser to testify, explained very clearly in his affidavit why the listing history of
the Ringling sale showed it was typical of the market at that time and not a distress sale.(R., p.
134, para.1 0) The 2004 Witter purchase is described as a comparable sale, even though the
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Witters were specially motivated buyers. (see Rick Witter affidavit, R., p.l24-125) The rest of
the exhibit is all data relating to sales on other lakes. As argued earlier, that information is simply
not relevant or probative because the markets are so different. This is just another example of the
assessor's relying on mass appraisal methods when they need to be addressing market value
techniques.
If there were any evidence of conformity with market value assessment standards, it
would have to be in the trial testimony. Erin Sacksteder referred to standard appraisal texts only
once. That was during examination by Mr. Wurzburg. (Tr.,p.23, L.23 -P.26.L.4) He admitted the

Appraising the Tough Ones is an authoritative text. (Tr., p.24, L.ll) He didn't explain failing to
make the market adjustments the text requires if going out geographically. (Tr., p.25.,L.l4-24)
He agreed that Petitioners' exhibit 10, showing non-buildable to buildable ratios is correct. (Tr.,p
.43,

10) He agreed that if there is enough current local data there is no need to go to other

markets (Tr., p.54, L.17) and that appraisal standards set no minimums for the number of
comparables needed (Tr., P.55, L.24- P.56, L.2) or limit on how far back in time an appraiser
can go. (Tr., p. 56, L.8-15) Finally, he admitted that he could have gone back farther than 2008
but chose not to.(Tr. P.57, L.6-13)
A market value appraiser looks at the entire record and then forms an opinion. Mr.
Sacksteder repeatedly used language showing that was not the process he used.

"It told me that they're questionable sales and that there was enough question about them that we
wanted to expand our search and see what else we could find to
support this adjustment that we put on Spirit Lake." (Tr., p.35, L.5-8)
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"We were just looking for support to see if our 50-percent adjustment on Spirit Lake was
correct." (Tr., p. 48, L.19,20)
"And because we did not have enough current sales information on Spirit Lake, we branched out
to see if we could imd some support out there for that 50-percent." (Tr. P. 50, L.18-21)
(emphasis added in all cases)

Mr. Sacksteder formed an opinion and looked for only the data which supported it. He ignores all
the data which shows the 50% ratio does not apply in many waterfront locations in Kootenai
County.

Mr. Wurzburg concluded his direct examination of Mr. Sacksteder after eliciting the admission
crucial to petitioners' case in the following exchange:

"you don't want to compare Spirit with Hayden in Coeur d'Alene? You've
testified to that effect in the past?
A When you're comparing values, you don't want to, yes.
Q. And why is that? A Because one lake could be a different value than
the subject lake.
MR. WURZBURG: I have no further questions, Your Honor." (Tr.,p. 26, L.1-11)

The assessor, Mr. McDowell conceded that it was sometimes necessary to go back in time;(Tr.,
p. 96, L.235 through p.97, L.9) that his office went back to 1988 when furnishing requested
historical supporting the 50% ratio; (Tr., p.98, L.2-6) and the assessor's office has been looking
at the ratio for several valuation cycles of five years each and that the ratio is typically around the
50% relationship. (Tr., p.98, L.16-25)
The assessors never used standard market value appraisal rules or guidance to explain
their methods. They never used appraisal institute or other authority to rebut taxpayers' evidence
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that going back in time was not only acceptable, but was in fact preferred. They never cited
authority for not making the location adjustments when going out geographically. They simply
said in effect "this is how we do our job of mass appraisals under Idaho statutes and Tax
Commission rules." They chose not to present fair market value evidence, opting instead to
prove compliance with assessment for tax purposes rules. There was simply no evidence
rebutting petitioners' evidence and thus no basis for the trial court's sustaining the assessor's
valuation.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF TAXPAYERS' EQUITABLE REMEDY
As discussed earlier in regard to assignment of error IV., the trial court improperly
ordered a dollar value set on the 2012 assessment of the subject property. Idaho courts have
equity jurisdiction. (Wolford v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho1062, 695 P.2d1201 (1984),Waters v.

Double L, Inc, 114 Idaho 256, 755 P.2d 1294 (Idaho. App.l987), Gonzaga University v.
Masini, 42 Idaho 660, 249 P. 93, (1926).
The most basic equitable maxim is that courts shall insure that justice and equit<; are done. There
are numerous specific maxims, but there are two that explain why this court should exercise its
equity jurisdiction to correct the 2012 assessment valuation which was not before the court
below.
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(1.) Equity will take jurisdiction to avoid a multiplicity of suits. "Where a court of equity

has all the parties before it, it will adjudicate upon all of the rights of the parties connected with
the subject matter of the action, so as to avoid a multiplicity of suits." Burnworth v. Hughes 670
P2d.917,234 Kan. 69 (1983) p.922
(2) "Equity does not require the doing of a useless thing." Apple v.Apple, 299 N.E.2d
239(242),157 Ind. App. 68 (1973)
Petitioners appealed the 2011 valuation to the Kootenai County Board of Equalization.
The commissioners didn't even listen to the assessor's evidence because they followed the
assessor's suggestion that there was no reason do go through the evidence because an appeal was
pending and the issue was going to be decided by a court. (Tr., p.1 0, L.19 to p.11, L.1) The
commissioners had indicated that they were going to await the court's decision in 2011. There
was no reason to believe they would not do the same in 2012. Another appeal would have been a
useless act and would have created a multiplicity of actions.
CONCLUSION
From the very first hearing before the commissioners sitting as a board of equalization,
taxpayers have presented a comparable sale analysis based on generally accepted market value
appraisal standards using Spirit Lake sales to establish that non buildable waterfront on that lake
is worth one third the value it would have if buildable. The assessor has responded by showing
its ad valorem mass appraisal method complies with Tax Commission ratio study rules, which it
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does. General compliance however, proves nothing about the accuracy of the individual
assessment that is at issue here.
Taxpayers' trial brief was filed on October 14,2011, nearly four months before the triaL
It and the entire Board of Equalization and Board ofTax appeals record made it clear that

taxpayers would argue that the assessor had not used generally accepted appraisal procedures for
market value determinations. Rather than present such evidence the assessor chose to stay with
the mass appraisal validation stndy approach and must now live with that decision. Their
spreadsheets and statistical analysis proved only that the assessor was generally in compliance
with mass appraisal standards and, when the data is examined, also show clearly that all the
markets are different. Taxpayers presented abundant uncontested evidence that the various lakes
and markets behave differently. That the markets were different was the very fact taxpayers had
to prove to show that going out geographically was not a valid market value appraisal method
unless location adjustments were made. No such location adjustments were made, leaving
taxpayers' going back in time on Spirit Lake as the only valid market value appraisal technique
before the trial court. In essence, when confronted with taxpayers' market value analysis the
assessor said "that's not how we do it as ad valorem mass assessors." There was no evidence
claiming that the taxpayers approach didn't comply with generally accepted appraisal standards
or was in some other way flawed- only the "that's not how we do it" answer. Idaho law however
requires a market value appraisal, not a valuation for assessment estimate.
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No remand for reconsideration is needed. The assessor had the opportunity to present
evidence of market value, but chose not to. The record is now complete and clearly shows that
unbuildable waterfront on Spirit Lake is properly valued at one third the value it would have if
buildable. This court should reverse the trial court and order that the 66.6 discount rate be
applied for the 2010, 2011 and 2012 tax years resulting in property values of$74,880 for 2010,
$63,648 for 2011, and $ 54,107 for 2012. As the prevailing party, petitioners are also entitled to
recover their costs upon timely submission ofthe Memorandum of Costs .
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ___day of January, 2013

Sid Wurzburg

I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of January, 2013 I hand delivered 2 copies of this brief and
appendixes to John Cafferty, attorney for respondent, 451 N. Government Way, P.O. Box 9000,
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000

Sid Wurzburg, Petitioner
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AN~T

RELATING TO PROPERTY TAX APPEALS 1 AMENDING SECTION 63-409, IDAHO CODE, TO
PROVIDE THAT IN AN APPEAL TAKEN REGARDING VALUATIONS OF OPERATING PROPERTY
THE BURDEN OF PROOF SHALL FALL ON THE PARTY SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF£ TO
PROVIDE STANDARDS AND TO PROVIDE FOR PROCEDURES; AMENDING SECTION 63-502,
IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT IN AN APPEAL TO THE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION THE
TAXPAYER SHALL HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF AND
TO PROVIDE A STANDARD OF EVIDENCE7 AMENDING SECTION 63-511, IDAHO CODE, TO
PROVIDE THAT IN APPEALS TAKEN TO THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS OR DISTRICT
COURT, THE BURDEN OF PROOF SHALL FALL UPON THE PARTY SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE
RELIEF, TO PROVIDE STANDARDS AND TO PROVIDE PROCEDURES~ AMENDING SECTION
63-3812, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF SHALL FALL UPON
THE PARTY SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF T TO PROVIDE STANDARDS AND TO PROVIDE
FOR PROCEDURES; DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING APPLICATION.
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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

16
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SECTION 1. That Section
amended to read as follows:

18
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63-409. APPEALS FROM STATE TAX COMMISSION VALUATIONS OF OPERATING PROPERTY. i l l Any taxpayer or county assessor who is aggrieved by a state tax commission decision assessing a taxpayer's operating property may file an appeal
to the district court of Ada county or, if such operating property is located
in only one (1) county, to the district court in and for the county in which
such operating property is located. The appeal shall be filed within thirty
(30) days after service upon the taxpayer of the decision. The appeal may be
based upon any issue presented by the taxpayer to the state tax commission and
shall be heard by the district court in a trial de novo without a jury in the
same manner as though it were an original proceeding in that court. Nothing
this section shall be construed to suspend the payment of taxes pen~
appeal. Payment of taxes while an appeal hereunder is pending shall not oper-
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24
25
26
27
28
29

63-409, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby

App. P. 1-2

ate to waive the right to an appeal. Any final order of the district court
under this section shall be subject to appeal to the Idaho supreme court in
the manner provided by the Idaho appellate rules.
f2) :In any appeal taken pursuant to this section, the burden of pr02f
shall fall upon the party seeking affirmative relief to establish that the
yaluation from which the appgal is taken is erroneous, or that the state ta¥
commission erred in its dgcision regarding a cla~ that certain properey iA
exgmgt from taxation. the yalue thereof, or any other relief §ought bef0£e thg
&tate tax cqmmi§§ion. A preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to sust&in
thg bu•dftn of proof. The burden of proof shall fall upon the party §eekinq
affirmative relief anj the burden of going forward with the evidence shall
shift as in other ciyil lit!gation. The district court shall render it§ decision in writing, including therein a copcise statement of the facts foupj by
the court and the conclusion§ of law reached by the court. The court may
2

affirm. pgverse, modify, or remand any or4er of the §tate tax commission, and
shall s-ant other •elief, invqke suqh other remedies and issue such ordg.s. in
accordance with its 4ecision, A§ appropriate.
SECTION 2. That Section
amended to read as follows:

63-502, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby

63-502. FUNCTION OF BOARD OF EQUALIZATION ON ASSESSMENTS. The function of
the board of equalization shall be confined strictly to assuring that the market value for assessment purposes of property has been found by the assessor,
and to the functions provided for in chapter 6, title 63, Idaho Code, relating
to exemptions from taxation. It is hereby made the duty of the board of equalization to enforce and compel a proper classification and assessment of all
property required under the provisions of this title to be entered on the
property rolls, and in so doing, the board of equalization shall examine the
rolls and shall raise or cause to be raised, or lower or cause to be lowered,
the assessment of any property which in the judgment of the board has not been
properly assessed. The board of equalization must examine and act upon all
complaints filed with the board in regard to the assessed value of any property entered on the property rolls and must correct any assessment improperly
made. ~he taXR§yer shall have 5he burden of proof in segk!ng affirmative
reAief to e§tablish that the determiaation of 5he asse§sor is erroneous,
iQcluding apy detepminatign of gsseSSed vgAue. A e.eponderance of the evidence
shall suffice to sustain the burden of proof.
SECTION 3. That Section 63-511, Idaho Code, be, and the
amended to read as follows:

same

is

hereby

63-511. APPEALS FROM COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION. ( 1) Any time within
thirty (30) days after mailing of notice of a decision of the board of equalization, or pronouncement of a decision announced at a hearing, an appeal of
any act, order or proceeding of the board of equalization, or the failure of
the board of equalization to act may be taken to the board of tax appeals.
Such appeal may only be filed by the property owner, the assessor, the state
tax commission or by a person aggrieved when he deems such action illegal oz
prejudicial to the public interest. Nothing in this section shall be construed
so as to suspend the payment of property taxes pending said appeal.
(2) Notice of such appeal stating the grounds therefor shall be filec
with the county auditor, who shall forthwith transmit to the board of ta~
appeals a copy of said notice, together with a certified copy of the minutef
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of the proceedings of the board of equalization resulting in such act, order
or proceeding, or a certificate to be furnished by the clerk of the board that
said board of equalization has failed to act in the time required by law on
any complaint, protest, objection, application or petition in regard to
assessment of the complainant's property, or a petition of the state tax co~
mission. The county auditor shall also forthwith transmit all evidence taken
in connection with the matter appealed. The county auditor shall submit all
such appeals to the board of tax appeals within thirty (30) days of being
notified of the appeal or by no later than October 1, whichever is later. The
board of tax appeals may receive further evidence and will hear the appeal as
provided in chapter 38, title 63, Idaho Code.
(3) Any appeal that may be taken to the board of tax appeals may, during
the same time period, be taken to the district court for the county in which
the property is located.
(4)
xn any appeal taken to the board of tax appeals or the district court
3

pursuant to this section, tke gurdeg of P£0Pf shall fall usgn the party seeking affirmative relief to establish that the valuation ~rom wgich the aooeal
is taken is erroneous, or that the b9ard of egyali;ation erred in its decision
regarding a claim that certain pa;;:opert;x is exempt from taxation, the value
thereof, or any gthel" relief sought h§fore the board of eqyal.ization. A p;eponderance of the eviQ.enc@ shftl.l suffice to sustain the burden of proof. The
bupden o£ proof shall fall upon the party seeking affirmative relief and the
burden of going forward with the evidence sh@ll shift as in other civil litiqati2n• The board of tax appeals or the digtrict court shall render its decision in writing, including therein a coqcige statement of the fact§ found by
the court AQd the cogql,.usions of law reachec'J. by the court. The board of ta;z
cmpeals or the court ma;r af~iq, reverse, modify or remand any order of the
b9ard of eqpalizatieg. and shal,.l grant other relief, invoke such other remedies. and issue §qgh OE4er§ ig accordance with its decision, as appropriate.
SECTION 4. That Section 63-3812, Idaho Code, be, and the same
amended to read as follows:

is

herebl

63-3812. APPEAL FROM BOARD -- PAYMENT OF TAXES WHILE ON APPEAL. WheneveJ
any taxpayer, assessor, the state tax commission or any other party appearinc
before the board of tax appeals is aggrieved by a decision of the board of ta:
appeals or a decision on a motion for rehearing, an appeal may be taken to the
district court located in the county of residence of the affected taxpayer, o:
to the district court in and for the county in which property affected by a
assessment is located. The appeal shall be taken and perfected in the follow
ing manner:
{a) The appellant shall cause notice specifying the grounds of appeal t
be filed with the appropriate district court and shall forthwith serve copie
of the notice with the clerk of the board of tax appeals and with all othe
party to the proceeding before the board within twenty-eight (28) days afte
copy of the final decision of the board shall have been deposited in the mail
The petition for judicial review shall conform with the requirements of th

Idaho rules of civil procedure, including rule 84(e). The

grounds

of

appea

specified in such notice shall frame the issues for such appeal.
(b) Any record made in such matter together with the record of all pre
ceedings shall be filed by the clerk with the district court of the prope
county.
{c} Appeals may be based upon any issue presented by the appellant to tr
board of tax appeals and shall be heard and determined by the court without

App. P. 1-4

12/Si

!-lOUSE BILL NO. 302- Property tax appeal/burden of proof

38
39
40
41

42

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

52
53

jury in a trial de novo on the issues in the same manner as though it were an
original proceeding in that court. The burden of proof shall fall upon the
PartY seeking affirmative relief to establish that the decision made by the
board of tax appeals is erroneous. A preponderance of the eyidepce shall suffiee to sustain the bupden of proof. The burden of prgof sha11 fall qpop the
party seeking affirmative relief and the PartY going forward with the evidence
shall shift as in other civil litigation. The court shall render its decision
in writing, including therein a concise statement of the facts found by the
court and conclusions of law reached by the court. The court may affirm,
reverse or modify the order, direct the tax collector of the county or the
state tax commission to refund any taxes found in such appeal to be erroneously or illegally assessed or collected or may direct the collection of additional taxes in proper cases.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to suspend the payment of
taxes pending any appeal, except that any privileges as to bonds or other
rights extended by the provisions of chapters 30 and 36, title 63, Idaho Code,
4

4

shall not be affected. Payment of taxes while an appeal hereunder is pending
shall not operate to waive the right to an appeal.
(e) Any final order of the district court under this section shall be
subject to appeal to the supreme court in the manner provided by law.

5
6
7
8

SECTION 5. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby
declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its
passage and approval and shall apply to all appeals filed after such date and
to all appeals pending but not yet decided as of such date.

1

2
3

Statement of Purpose I Fiscal Impact
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS 12964
Identifies the standard to be applied and the burden of proof in
appeals of property tax assessments to the County Board of
Equa1ization, the Board of Tax Appea1s or the district court.
This 1egislation changes the legal standard from one that
requires proof that an assessment is manifestly excessive,
arbitrary and capricious, or fraudulent and oppressive, to one
that requires simply that the assessment is erroneous. It
changes the burden of proof to satisfy that standard from a
"clear and convincing" burden to the normal "preponderance of the
evidence" standard applicable to most civil cases.
FISCAL IMPACT
There is no fiscal impact.

Contact
Name:

Rep. Dell Raybould
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APPENDIX2

CHAPTER38
BOARD OF TAX APPEALS

63-3813. Conclusive decision. In all cases which are not appealed to the district court
within the prescribed time, the decision of the board of tax appeals shall be conclusive
and all records shall be corrected to comply with the decision of the board. A final
decision or order of the board of tax appeals directing a market value change for taxable
property that is not further appealed shall be fixed for the current year appealed and there
shall be no increase in value for the subsequent assessment year when no physical change
occurs to the property; provided however, that annual trending or equalization applied to
all properties of a property class or category within the county or a clearly defined area
shalJ still apply. If the order requires repayment or refund of taxes these shall be repaid or
refunded by the proper authorities and, if the order affirms or establishes a liability for the
payment of taxes, the usual procedure for collection of such taxes shall continue or
commence.
History:
[63-3813, added 1969, ch. 453, sec. 13, p. 1195; am. 2002, ch. 332, sec. 1, p. 938.]
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This spreadshflt ts a group of sales put together to show the relatlonshlp of how an Individual sales ratio, when standing alone cDn e1ppear
to look like a property has been assessed too high or too low. But a category of properties as a whole, measured bV a slgn!Rcont number of
representative s1:1tes, Should appear to be assessed dose to 100%. See Ratlo column highlighted In green.

..

...

...........

,

·-·

......

.......

,

_,

_

SALE7

!:SALE 11

Matched Pair Sales
Sale 7 Located in the Harrison area on the East side of Coeurd A'lene Lake. It is a vacant unbiuldable waterfront lot of 100ft with

sloping topography. It has gravel road access. An August 2007 sale price of $255,000 + 100 ff = $2,550ff rate for unbuildable
frontage . The first 1OOff x $1,500ff (OCR3 unbuildable ff rate applied)= $150,000. Total value $150,000 + $255,000 = 59%
Ratio
Sale 11 Located just a little north of sale seven in the Harrison area on the East side of Coeurd A'lene Lake. It is a vacant biuldable
waterfront lot of 100.98ffwith sloping topography. It has gravel road access. A September 2007 sale price of $300,000 +
100.98 ff = $2,971ff rate for vacant buildable frontage. The first 100ft x $2,500ff (0CR3 buildable ff rate applied)= $250,000.
Plus .98ffx $1 ,500ffx.90(0CR3 unbuildable ff rate applied, minus a10% length adjustment)= $1,323. Total value $251,323 +
$300,000 84% Ratio
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Sale 9 Located on the Northwest side of Hayden Lake on English Point road. It is a vacant unbuildable steep waterfront lot sitting
in a draw with a creek and a access road runn ing through it, and a dock. A March 2008 sale price of $530,000, time adjusted
downward 3/4% a month to $494,225-$11,860 dock va lue= $482,3651and residual. $482,365 +182.9ff = $2,637ff (rate for
unbuildable frontage) . The first 1OOff x $2, 125ft (OCR3 unbuildable ff rate applied)= $212,500. Plus 82.9ff x $2,215ff x.90
(Length adjustment) =$158,584. Add acreage of .723 x $8,500 = $6,145. Assessed value $389,089 + $494,225 = 79% Ratio
Sale 12 Located on the Northwest side of Hayden Lake on English Point road. It is a vacant buildable steep waterfront lot sitting in
a draw with a creek and a access road running through it. Per Multiple Listing Service it has a septic easement. It's a
September 2008 sale price of $229,000 time adjusted downward 3/4% a month to $222,130 + 44.89 ff = $4,948ff (rate for
vacant buildable frontage). Valued at 44.89ff x $4,250ff (OCR3 buildable ff rate applied) x1.1 0% (length adjustment)=
$209,860. Add acreage of 1.0442 x $8,500 = $8,875 Total assessed value $218,735 + $222,130 98% Ratio

=

